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On the Ethics of Constructing Communication 
By 
Klaus Krippendorff 
The Annenberg School for Communication 
University ofYennsylvania 
ON THE ETHICS OF CONSTRUCTING COMMUNICATION* 
by Klaus Krippendorff 
Abstract 
Draw others like yourself. 
s 
\ 、o
(after Saul Steinberg) 
Figure 1 
*This paper was prepared as Presidential Address to the International Communication 
Association Conference on Paradigm Dialogues , in Honolulu , Hawaii delivered there on 
May 26 , 1983 and slightly revised in April l&87 . ’ 
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련쁘뾰g띤팍략않쁘 
To me , II paradigm dialogues ll could mean , first , 딴략댐쁘E 쁘띤!E략므브츠멜흐 a 
scholarly discourse about different approaches to communication research. Under the 
name of Paradigmatology , Magoroh Maruyama (1974) already attempted such comparisons 
of IIcross-displinary , cross-professional and cross-cultural communication" and 1 
don ’ t need to repeat his work here. IIParadigm dialogues ll could mean , second , 
뾰쁘면은 맨쁘g 뜨쁘브rs representing 딴훨뜨쁘프 연펀한멜~ and 1 suppose this has been 
practiced throughout a good number of sessions at the Hawaii conference 
Fortunately or not , the format of a single-authored paper does not lend itself t。
such an interpretation. "Paradigm dialogues" could also mean , third , the 얀프맡므g 
E으gether 으￡ 브츠효E은re프!E효프르브호융띤~， perhaps to show paradigmatic differences to be 
merely artificial , a matter of polemics rather than substance , a search for the 
unifying core of truth. It is this interpretation that 1 want to take as a point of 
departure for making my own proposal for 1 belieγe it to be difficult if not 
impossible to bridge true paradigmatic differences 
According to Thomas Kuhn , a paradigm is a unity of 
(a) methodology , i.e. , the formal rules of scientific practice , 
(b) scientific problems which are solved against the background of 
(c) consensus of what counts as an acceptable explanation , 
i.e. , what it takes for a scientific problem to be s01γed. probably the most 
important property of a paradigm is that it contains its own justification. It 
defines rationality , objectivity , sets conditions of truth by means of rational 
procedures and prevents non-objective and false e1ements to enter the knowledge 
generated by this paradigm. Paradigms are self-sealing in the sense that n。
empirical evidence judged acceptable within a paradigm can challenge its validity 
Paradigms that accept the same methodology , scientific problems and 
explanations are cornmensurable and dialogue between cornmensurable paradigms is , 
according to Thomas K바lTI ， normal discourse. Such discourse has the effect of 
reinforcing and elaborating the scientific practice in either "paradigm ll and one 
could argue that commensurable paradigms are not really different. 
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Between incomrnensurable paradigms , cornmunication is , according to Kuhn , either 
abnormal or revolutionary. It is abnormal if the established paradigm succeeds not 
。nly in protecting itself against the challenging paradigm but moreoγer in rendering 
the latter irrational , ínvalid , subjectiγe ， unworthy or silly. Communication is 
reγolutionary if the established paradigm succombs , is surpassed or transcended hy 
the challenging paradigm , requiring radical (in the sense of going to its "roots") 
reformulation and a new consensus on methodology , scientific problems and solutions. 
Thus , if we talk about truly different , i.e. , incommensurable paradigms , paradigm 
dialogue in the sense of bringing paradigms together or into harmony is impossible. 
In view of this impossibility 1 shall therefore take the liberty of 
interpreting "paradigm dialogues ll in a fourth sense and propose 효 므ew E프E효브손응댄 for 
communication studies , if not for the social sciences generally , 프 E략펀댈핀 댄효트 면은 
먼은 쁘프핀프프X 으￡ 띤략않뽀 르E 프프 프약은 1 belieγe we are witnessing the emergence 
。f many cracks in the foundations of the established and largely naturalistic 
paradigm , that render this receiγed view sornewhat shaky and suggest reγ。 lutionary
changes might be imminent if not timely. 1 am convinced that our (pre-paradigrnatic , 
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i.e. , naive) experience in communication leads up to this new paradigm and that 
cornmunication scholars are or could be the avant-garde of this paradígrnatic 
revolution. At this point my own understanding of this new paradigm is limited and 
my proposal necessarily highly tentative 
Since paradigms are neither challenged nor established by evidence , 1 am 
ínγiting you to particípate ín an epistemologícal journey. It entails constructíng 
with me a reality , a world that the existing paradigm might consider entirely 
imaginary (in the sense of non-existing , TIot worthy of study , crazy or outrageous) , 
entering in it as wel1 as applyíng ít to your own experíences , partícularly in 
communicating with others , and then asking whether the implications of this new 
world realize human desires more readily than those of the established world. At 
the end of the tour , 1 hope you might find that the imaginary world 1 have been 
constructing will turn out to be not so imaginary after all and that the design 
principles for the construction of this reality are applicable not only t。
understanding cornmunication as a dia10gue but a1so to the scientific practíce of 
acquiring knowledge about people , society , and if you need to treat it separately , 
nature. 
댄르 혈프프므gf략쁘츠g핀 
The mínd derives its limíts not from nature 
but from its own prescriptions (Immanuel Kant)) 
To characterize the current paradigrn , agaínst which a new one rnust be 
contrasted , let me start the journey with some of the metaphors used ín our 
scientific practice. Recent writers in philosophy and linguistics have suggested 
that metaphors p1ay a centra1 ro1e in 1anguage , thought and action (Ortony , 1979; 
Sacks , 1979; Lackoff and Johnson , 1980 , 1987; Sa1mond , 1982) and that they might 
provide the key to the rea1ities in which their users 1ive and do their work. 
Scientific discourse 8eems to heavily rely on agricultural metaphors. Anne 
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Sa1mond (1982) termed this the "Know1edge is 1andscape" metaphor. Indeed , we 띤꽉브g 
k띤보논브æ 핀드으 똥E프략e f프쁘E 츠므 쁘프브 we 쁘rk ， we define 르뜨편 of study , try t。
뽀르E 브으쁘연E츠르프 and defend us against 핀프브략으쁘 by those that haγe no business 
doing work where we already are. 30me 프얀브E 표트 E..!:으면으단Z료 and y프쁘 insights , 
others 얀뾰 릎E 프막뜨 and working in them ís 얀약약효현 Re1ated to such 
agricultural rnetaphors is a second one , cal1ed "understanding is seeing." We take 
쁘프프프므은 프 쁘e f프쁘， haγe 으므단쁘ks or p.으프뜨 약 프프~， choose between 띤프연 으E 
띤효cr으효으으E츠~ p.erspectives , 브으k 효t things 핀약르 약딴략y ， emp10y a 므효rrow 쁘으프온， 
inc1ude 효 판브르 프므g트 。f phenomena or 효P.E..!:으효으낀 a prob1em with an 으E쁘 띤프브 Comrnon 
to these metaphors is that 프 프월브묘 엎프뜨 똑E프략략X 효프핀 쁘르 효으프므단단으 쁘똑쁘얀 · 
Wh i1e work is undeniab1y needed to ti11 a fie1d and to harvest its crops , the nature 
of the crops is governed by another metaphor that Sa1mond ca11s "facts are natura1 
objects. 1I Our research reports refer to facts as 브프브， 띤뜨펀， 연프뜨뜨e or t쁘밑쁘E 
Facts are r떤， 으브와므략， 략뾰논 or uncontaminated. Facts are 프트략막연 프~， g약뜨브， 
효쁘브，p.프뾰브 브p.， 뜨묘뜨뜨브， 뿔쁘뜨르브 from above ground or 쁘덮프얀연， 쁘턴뜨쁘브， 띤g 
프p. from be10w the surface. Once observers have ~브E효츠프E브 such natura1 and thing-1ike 
facts , they may ~으뜨 them , 쁘르츠æ them , 브효조르므으료 them , 효프펀nge them , 토쁘띤욕흐르 them , 
E똥뜨프르 them , 조쁘E 르t them , 브esc프손브~ them , rec으E브 them and E..!:으뜨ss them in the form 
。f data. 
Additionally , metaph0rs like "understanding is seeing" and "facts are natural 
。bjects ll not onlγ set obserγers apart from what they observe but also provide the 
metaphorical grounding of the notion of "objectivity." Facts are objective when 
they are discovered in their natural form and habitat. In every-day talk , the 
assertion IIthis is a fact ll kills al1 questions about validity for facts are 
considered inherently 쁘뾰띤쁘논 unquestionable ， 프뜨프면만-"-， 포면k 효프 쁘맨똥관흔은 
and can therefore not be doubted or argued with. In scientific discourse , it is 
their ~ E!.츠으프호 and independent physical existence that makes facts and eγerything 
deriγed from them "objectiγe ll • Research , literal1y IIrepeated search" or "repeated 
exarnination ll of scientific facts , 브프므~ 효으rth ， E은X은효조프， 브쁘르호보s or 브쁘프효E프 the 
uncontan띠ated 뜨프쁘 -- like the peeling of a fruit -- and 쁘딴은， 딴포브y!!. or 
describes its objective core 
The consistent use of such expressions in every-day talk as well as in 
scientific discourse characterizes the work of an extremely powerful paradigrn that 
governs the production of knowledge in society , guides much of social research , 
controls virtually all inquiries into human comrnunication and must be serving the 
existing institutions well. 
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1 am suggesting that the key to this existing paradigm lies in the metaphorical 
grounding of objectivity in the conception of thing-like objects existing outside 
and independent of scientific observers. Two basic premises seem to characterize 
its ontological cornmitrnents. The first locates the objects of scientific inquiry in 
a 브므츠요브르 domain in which they can be found , distinguished and referred to. It says 
OBSERVERS SHALL ACCEPT ONLY ONE REALITY. 
Although researchers obviously can choose among various domains in this reality __ 
metaphorica11y , among specia1ized fie1ds to devote attention to -- whicheγer domain 
is chosen , no two objects can be thought of occupying the same space within it just 
as no single object can be conceived to be two different things at the same time 
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It u1timate1y fol1ows that the 브므츠.verse affords only one 브므츠que explanation and 
conflicting ones prove biases in perception that need to be corrected at al1 costs 
(Witness the discomfort with the coexistence of and subsequent efforts to unify the 
particle and waγe form theories of 1ight which didn ’ t even 1ead to conflicting 
predictions). Heinz von Foerster (1979) phrased the second premise of this dominant 
paradigm most e10quently 
OBSERVERS SHALL NOT ENTER THEIR DOMAIN OF OBSERVATION. 
It simply entai1s the commitment by scientific obserγers to describe the world as is 
and independent of the act of observation 
A1though 1 am trying to avoid big names for various forms of -isms and of 
famous phi1osophers of science , it is quite obvious that the ontological commitment 
entailed by these premises under1y logica1 positivism , neo-positiγism and the kind 
of empiricism that be1ieves a11 know1edge is bui1t upon elementary sensations 
through which the wor1d revea1s its structure and appears to its observer as what it 
lI in fact lT is. Anthony Giddens (in this γ。 lume) prefers the term U naturalistic 
paradigm ll to refer to the same and 1 have no quarrel with that. 
Before involving communication in my argument , let me show how this receiγed 
paradigm has managed to eγade the cha11enges it encounters by withdrawing behind 
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suitable limits for normal scientific inquiry within which the two basic premises d。
survive. The two limits I will mention are Heisenberg ’ s Uncertainty Principle and 
Bertrand Russell ’ s Theory of Logical Types. A third , Karl Popper ’ s Falsification 
Criterion will be mentioned later. 
Heisenberg ’ s Uncertainty Principle recognizes that , in quantum physics , every 
measurement requires an exchange of energy , disturbs the natural condition of the 
measured object and states that it is impossible to simultaneously measure the 
position and the velocity of atomic particles with arbitrary precision. The 
principle holds in the microcosm of quantum physics. Perhaps it is less limiting in 
every-day (macro) physics , including astronomy , where the act of observation may not 
significantly alter what is observed , but it certainly has its equivalent in the 
social sciences where observer influences are the rule , not the exception. A 
generalization of the principle could say: the more the act of obserγation 
(measurement) affects an object in the observed (measured) variables the greater 
will be the uncertainty as to what is observed (what the rneasurernents represent) , 
the properties of the undisturbed object or the effects of observing (measuring) it 
In other words , the more an observer probes or prompts the data of interest , the 
less information will these data contain about what the object was like before the 
observation began. 
Note that Heisenberg ’ s Uncertainty Principle and its generalization is stated 
entirely within the existing paradigm. It makes the normal ontological commitments 
and particularlý upholds the traditional ideal of objectiγity as an accurate 
representation of observed facts. Nowhere does the principle undermine or challenge 
the existing paradigrn , but it asserts its very limit , stating that 쁘묘약핀프X 프 
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llnachieγab1e 쁘en 쁘똥프효브으프 (measurement) 츠프 쁘E 효 뜨프으브X 으쁘객효YE으으똑프· 
One 1atent consequence of this paradigmatic 1imit is that on1y those empirica1 
situations are appropriate for scientific observations in which scientific obserγers 
can assure thernselves and others that they have not interfered in their dornain of 
。bservation. Indeed researchers working within this paradigm spend a great dea1 of 
effort to preserve a separate , natural and uncontarninated reality eγen when it 
becomes apparent that this is difficu1t. Our textbooks ca11 attention to the 
dangers of experimenta1 biases , the frequent1γ dernonstrated experience that 
preconceptions and intentions , even by rninor laboratory personnel J rnay 
surreptitiously influence the results of scientific experirnents. We fear 
methodo1ogica1 biases , the possibi1ity that data may inc1ude measuring artifacts or 
be inf1uenced by the choice of inγestigatiγe techniques. We a1so try to aγ。 id
we11-known interγiewer biases , the effects of interviewer characteristics , 
interviewing situations , and ways of asking questions on the kind of responses 
recorded. The wide1y promoted use of 끄므으브tr프효츠Z트 인료효은브re효 (Webb , et a1. , 1966) in 
the social sciences , content analysis , for exarnple , in preference to experirnents 
with subjects , survey and fie1d research , in which indiγiduals are forced to react 
to the obserγing scientist ’ s rnanipulations , point to the sarne conclusion. T。
E똥트rve 쁘르 트즈프단므g E.략르딴g띤， 츠E 츠프 손뾰뜨략프e t으 뾰약브람e f프핀 E으프므단E손으 
E효프얀프효브으E 효브 E프프효단으므E 츠므 밴프h 쁘프뜨E뜨효 르re 손띤약X르브 。r of which theγ are 
constit‘lent parts. This is particu1ar1y the case in a11 situations in which the 
acquisition of know1edge and practica1 action go hand in hand , for examp1e in 
psychiatric work , rnanagernent , cornmunity developrnent , political cornmunication , and of 
course , dialogue 
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A coro11ary of Heisenberg ’ s principle 8eems due to the 1eSB conclusiγe but 
nevertheless frequent mechanism of E프으 ject츠으므 For whatever reason , it 8eems more 
natural for researchers to recognize their own preferred (or under the existing 
paradigm prescribed and hence considered most "na tural ll ) relation to reality in the 
relations among the things , people or organizations they attempt to describe. 
Projecting the paradigmatically prescribed one-way communication from an undísturbed 
reality to its observer , not surprisingly , most cornmunication models are als。
one-way in the sense that they start with a sender and end with the effects on a 
receiver and thereby equate communication with control. Most causal models are als。
linear , linking initial conditions to subsequent events. To assure such IIcleanll 
。ne-way causality , textbooks in statistics teach us always to distinguish between 
independent and dependent variables or predictor and criterion variables ‘ 
Input-output mode1s , whether their boxes are described in terms of 1ogica1 nets , 
transition matrices , transformations or production functions , all tend to be 
unidirectional. And data analysis , coding and translation are generally seen as a 
mappíng from a domain to its range. The preference for one-way processes also leads 
to a variety of meta-physical extrapolations. When one 100ks for the causes of 
causes , causes of causes of causes , etc. one ís easily led to Aristotle ’ s ultimate 
rnover. And when one looks for consequences of consequences one is naturally led t。
u1timate purposes to which everything seems to converge. 
The second paradigmatic 1imit is revealed in Russell ’ s Theory of Logical Types 
(Wh itehead and Russell , 1910). The theory was invented to litera11y end tw。
thousand years of uneasy puzzlement over paradoxes in logic , in mathematics and most 
recently in the social sciences. In the scholarly community , paradoxes had always 
been a source of intellectual entertainrnent but taken not very seriously otherwise 
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For example , díd Epimenedes , the Cretan philosopher , who said that "all Cretans are 
liars" lie or tell the truth? Can the command to "disobey this command" be 
fol1owed? What does it mean to say "1 am not talking to you"? Logical 
contradictions indeed rob a 1anguage of its descriptiγe power , but paradoxes 
moreover introduce an unsettling circularity: when one believes Epimenedes to tel1 
the truth one is 1ed to the conc1usion that he must be 1ying and when one accepts 
him to be a 1iar one is 1ed to the conc1usion that he is te11ing the truth , etc. 
Statements of this kind have right1y been ca11ed vicious and cou1d not be a110wed t。
enter a paradigm cornmitted to the conception of a single and obserγer independent 
rea1ity. 
Russe11 c1ear1y recognized the se1f-reference in these paradoxes as the chief 
villain of the problern. Indeed , Epimenedes made a staternent about Cretans , but , 
being a Cretan himself , he made the statement assert its own invalidity , thus 
invoking the never-ending vicious cycle of alternating γa1idations. But Russe11 ’ s 
phi1osophy of science a1so made the by now fami1iar onto1ogica1 commitment that 
realíty is unique , resides outside its observer and becomes manifest through an 
observer ’ s sensations. Language , to be meaningful , must then always be descriptive 
。f something other than itse1f , u1timate1y of an obserγer ’ s sensations. Instead of 
coping with the se1f-referentia1 nature of 1anguage , Russe11 capitu1ated to his 
phi1osophica1 commitments and invented the injunctiγe Theory of Logica1 Types which 
assures that statements on one 1ogica1 1eve1 make references on1y to things 
(statements) on a 10wer 1ogica1 1eγe1 ， thus 쁘약단략므g 효프 으프으프보r c。nstructions
프띤 쁘튼 논일단핀략트 뜨딴쁘므E 으￡ 핀뾰프프g 뜨프므단략흐 
The Theory of Logica1 Types not on1y ru1es paradoxes out of existence but a1s。
12 
declares as meaningless a11 notions that have self-reference at their roots: the 
conception of observers as active participants' in their own affairs , the notions of 
self-organization , self-determination , autonomy and dialectical processes , a11 of 
which invo1γe self-constituting or self-contradicting circular references. To 
exclude a great many phenomena , particularly in the social world , from scientific 
penetration , just to preserve the foundations of the existing paradigm (which 
Wh itehead and Russe11 ’ s work he1ped to bui1d) is a rather drastic measure and a 
supreme demonstration of the power the dorninand paradigm exercises in our scientific 
enterprise. In a recent paper (Krippendorff , 1984) 1 cou1d 1ink morphogenesis and 
structural growth in cognition , in society and in scientific constructions to the 
emergence and successful resolution of paradoxes. Ruling paradoxes out of existence 
shows the existing paradigm no longer capable of experiencing conditions conducive 
to structural expansion , thus 쁘약프g 프효 으쁘 브프프프 뜨 ß!:앤드브. 
The Theory of Logical Types has several latent consequences , the most obvious 
being its exc1usive1y referentia1 use of 1anguage , obserγation and measurement. A 
1anguage describes an object 1anguage and in turn is described by a meta-1anguage 
which is in turn described by a meta-meta-1anguage and so fourth ad infinitum. The 
fact that Goede1 put a 1imit to this theoretica1ly infinite expansion is rare1y 
recognized in scientific practice. A more remarkable consequence is the associated 
preference for hierarchies of things , concepts , peop1e and in socia1 forms. For 
example values , which are conceived to account for and hence refer to how sorneone 
decides among a1ternatives , must then be p1aced into a 10gica1 type higher then the 
decisions they govern. To account for decisions among appropriate values requires 
values of a higher order and to account for those , requires γalues of an even higher 
。rder ， etc. This 1eads to hierarchical 쁘면떤프띤 without ever reaching closure 
13 
except in 50me universal principle like a singular god. Or social control) which 
imp1ies the abi1ity of one person to prescribe what another shou1d do , puts the 
contro11er on a 1ogica1 1eve1 higher than the contro11ed and immediate1y favours the 
description of social organizations in hierarchical terms and the location of 
u1timate responsibi1ity on top of this hierarchy. The fascistic nature of this 
social forrn rnust be mentioned , albeit in passing. Many systerns theorists , working 
within the existing paradigm , virtua11y equate systems with hierarchica1 forms of 
。rganization (e.g. Mi11er , 1978) and find hierarchies in the organization of the 
universe (Gallaxies containing solar systems containing planets containing ... ), in 
the organization of scientific discip1ines (phi1osophy->theoretica1 
sciences->app1ied sciences-> ... ) in the organization of 1iving things (the Linnean 
system of c1assification , for examp1e) , etc. Coup1ed with this paradigm's 
。ntological commitrnent , Russell ’ s Theory of Logica1 Types makes socia1 scientists , 
who are most obviously entangled with the social use of language , see hierarchies t。
be the most natural forms of organization and exclude a11 circular and autonornous 
forrns frorn their legitimate concern or render accounts of such forms meaningless. 
In summary , Heisenberg ’ s Uncertainty Princip1e states the 1imit of what can be 
。bjective1y observed within the existing paradigm. Russe11 ’ s Theory of Logica1 
Types exorcises those circular forms that would erode its foundations. Both render 
this paradigm rather restrictive , at least to rne , and 1 wonder why so many 
communication researchers ho1d on to it in their dai1y work. 
Communication 
To give some "substance" to my proposal , let me start with a Zen-story. It 
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shows , perhaps a bit extreme , the kind of experiences 1 believe we a11 encounter 
when communicating with others , whether these are friends or strangers , or whether 
we are in pursuit of change or mere attentive observers. 1 would hope indeed that 
the experiences the story invokes shed light on our dual role as ordinary 
communicators and as communication researchers for 1 wil1 later make no difference 
between the two , except for the level of awareness , observational skil1s , critícal 
ability. and social responsibility we ought to assert for ourselγes 
The story is as follows: 
프엎핀g 막략많쁘 얀E 므뾰프g 
Provided he makes and wins an argument about Buddhism with those wh。
live there , a~y wandering monk can remain in a Zen temple. If he i8 
defeated , he has to move on. 
In a temple in the northern part of Japan two brother monks were 
dwel~~ng :ope~h~r. The elder one was learned. but the younger one was 
stupid and had but one eye 
A wan~e;ing monk came and asked for lodging. properly challenging 
them to a debate about the sublime teaching. Thè ~ld~r b~other. ti~~d 
that day from much ~tudying. told the younger one to take his place. "G。
and request the dialogue in silence , 11 he c~utioned. 
So the young monk and the stranger went to the shrine and sat down 
Shortly afterwards the traveler rose and went in to the elder brother 
and said: "Your young brother i8 a wonderful fellow. He defeated me. 11 
Relate the dialogue to me ," said the elder one 
"Well ," :x~~~ined~ the ~~aveler ， "first 1 held up one finger , 
represent1ng Buddha , the enlightened 。ne. s。 he held up tw。 finσers ， 
signifying Buddha and his teaching I held up three fingers , reEresenting 
Buddha , his teaching , and his f。llowers ， living the harm。ni。us life. Then 
he sh。。k his clenched fist in my face , indicating that all three c。me fr。m
。ne realization. Thus he won and so 1 haγe no right to remain here. 1I 
With this. the traveler left. 
"Where is that fellow?" asked the younger one , running in to his 
elder brother. 
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"1 understand you won the debate." 
"Won nothing. 1 ’ m going to beat hirn up. 11 
"Te1l me the subject of the debate ," asked the elder one 
"\야ly ， the minute he saw me he held up one finger , insulting me by 
insinuating that 1 have only one eye. Since he was a stranger 1 thought 1 
would be polite to him , so 1 held up two fingers , congratulating him that 
he has two eyes. Then the impolite wretch held up three fingers , 
suggesting that between us we on1y have three eyes. So 1 got mad and 
started to punch him , but he ran out and that ended it!" 
(Reps , undated: 28-30) 
What can we learn from this? One lesson i8 that each cornmunicator lives in an 
entire1y different rea1ity. The other , that despite the absence of cognitive 
sharing there is apparent1y no misunderstanding. A third is that information f10ws 
circularly between the two debaters and this interaction or alteraction , one shou1d 
say , produces knowledge that makes the traveller leave. 1 shall refer back to the 
details of this story but want to ask first what a communication researcher working 
under the natura1ist paradigm could learn from the incidence had he been a 
participant ’ 
In a debater ’ s position , this cornmunication researcher would haγe to regard the 
dialogue an experience that is contaminated by personal and subjectiγe elements 
which the received paradigm can not admit as a basis for evidence. Trying to be 
。이 ective ， he might not be aware that it i5 his own ínterpretation of the situation 
that casts the other ’ s intentions , whích leads him to confuse what.he sees with what 
takes place lI in fact. 11 Being aware of his own interest in the outcome of the debate 
would make his assessments value-laden. And being forced to interact with his 
opponent , actively influencing what he observes without comparable controls , 
violates the dernand for unbiased observation and provides no experirnental basis for 
generalizations. Fínally , the "hard facts" he could have recorded by a camera , for 
example , the sequence lI one finger , two fingers , three fingers , f1st" saγs nothing 
about why the trave11er 1eft and the γ。unger rnonk was 1eft angry. In other words , 
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should this normal communication researcher end up raving , as the traveller probably 
does , about the bri11iant one-eyed monk to whom he 10st the debate , he wou1d haγe t。
speak as an ordinary individual. A behavioral scientist would have to subtract 
near1y everything that might be meaningfu1 to those invo1ved , te11 an interesting 
anecdote at best , but contribute nothing to a theory of human communication 
Presumably , our communication researcher would be more comfortable in the 
position of the older brother who , being the medium through which the storγ is 
revealed , resernbles that of an objective , detached and superior observer , a position 
the received paradigm favours. In a way it is the older brother who sets up an 
"experiment" by te11ing the two other monks to debate (in si1ence) and receiving in 
return each individual ’ s "response" in the forrn of a report of what happened. But , 
since it 1s impossible for our comrnunication researcher to conceive of the existence 
。f mu1tip1e rea1ities--even so , each debater c1aimed his version to be the fact and 
the zen-story does not present judgements as to who is ríght--his onto1ogica1 
commitments disposes him to construe the two debaters ’ reports as tw。 쁘탤뜨쁘E 
interpretations 약 면트 월쁘 확뜨프 However ， since he did not obserγe these presumed 
facts himse1f , in order to preserve this paradigmatically required form of 
exp1anation , he wí11 have to infer a rea1ity from these reports and distinguish 
between facts and interpretations or between the objective situation and their 
subjective ref1ections. Ascertaining such differences and ascribing biases to them 
c1ear1y imp1icates the natura1istic paradigm and revea1s the outsíde observer to be 
in a position privi1eged to see the wor1d as is whí1e denyíng this abi1ity to those 
observed. We can dísmiss the who1e story as mere fiction but we cou1d also ask 
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。utselves whether the facts inγ。1ved are the very 1inguistica11y revea1ed 
constructions , and for the older brother the linguistically revealed interpretations 
。f these constructions , as it were , each constitutive of different realities through 
which communication makes sense. 1 am suggesting that the received observer 
position wi11 1ead to numerous difficu1ties of understanding that cannot be reso1ved 
within the existing paradigm. The unilateral c1aim to objectivity by scientific 
。bservers at the exc1usion of the observed øther observers being a particu1ar1y 
untenable position to take. 
C1early , there must be something wrong with a paradigm that is so 1ittle suited 
to produce knowledge about human communication and creates 50 many epistemological 
prob1ems for itself. Let me square1y suggest that the age-01d conception of a 
sing1e reality and the injunction against 1etting the scientific observers enter 
their domain of observation needs to be removed from our scientific practice and be 
rep1aced by other , empirically 1ess restrictive and ethica11y more acceptable 
imperatives. In what fo11ows now 1 am proposing five imperatiγes ， an 쁘뜨뾰프던L 
an 면만프덮뜨 a se1f-refentia1 , an 약핀던조 and a 똑약화 츠뾰뜨략브르 They constitute 
not a co11ection from which to pick one and not the other , but an integrated whole , 
a system that hangs together and defines a E효E효쁘멜 핀 프프 으쁘 프g얀 Need1ess t。
say , 1 find this paradigm far more attractiγe than the one it hopefully cha11enges 
and rep1aces. Let me consider these imperatives one-by-one and e1aborate their 
imp1ications , keeping in mind the tentative nature of my proposa1 
The Aesthetical 조핀E효프효드츠프르 
The aesthetical imperative quite innocent1y reads 
CONSTRUCT YOUR OWN REALITY TO SEE 
and is intentionally arnbiguous , for it rneans both that "in order to see we must 
engage in the construction of reality " and "what we see is the realities we have 
constructed." The Zen-story exemplifies this with considerable clarity 
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Apparently , ~효으뇨 c。rnmunicat。r 브X효E 츠므 X르"Ei. 뾰프르프트므드 프트략프츠르프 indeed. We ought t。
respect this empirical fact. Each has constructed an individually coherent dialogue 
that gives meaning to the sequence of individual experiences. Had the older brother 
watched the silent debate as well , he may have come up with a version of his own. 
There is no question about who is right and who is wrong. Each rnakes sense of his 
。wn actions and experiences and does 80 in hís own terrns. Through the eyes of the 
。lder brother , we are witnessing the existence not of a universe but a ’ duo-verse ’ ‘ 
And , if the older brother ’ s reality and that of other possible observers would be 
added , we rnust admit the existence of a 띤므프호二ver프트 。f ideo-typical and tenuously 
connected realities. 
Furthermore , the IIthings" that were accounted for in the two debaters ’ reports 
are nowhere objective or outside the two communicators. Each re-presents its own 
actions and its own experiences subsequent to these actions , and these are entered 
into each ’ s own construction of the dialogue. Even though some of the words are 
used in both reports , e.g. , "one finger ," "two fingers ,1I etc. , they play different 
roles in these constructions. 1 am suggesting that whatever i5 seen is always 
preceded by , or seen through , a construction that entails certain expected 
perceptions. In the story , the gist of these constructions is an alternating 
sequence of non-verbal signs ultimately deciding on whether the stranger could stay 
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。r would have to leave. None of the two reports is more objective than the other 
The o1der brother has two texts to compare and the privi1ege of this comparison does 
not set him above the two debaters ’ abi1ity to construct their own rea1ities 
There are many bio1ogica1 examp1es where seeing and constructing go hand in 
hand. The 브브띤 옆으t in our retina demonstrates that we do not miss what we can't 
sense and we rnake up , albeit unconsciously , what we think should be there (after von 
Foerster , 1981: 288-289) 학쁘잎겉E 브갚으n he1ps exp1aining why the nervous system 
had t。 γirtua11y ínvent a thírd dímensíon ín order to cope wíth the conf1ícting 
ímages ín our two retínas (after Bateson , 1979:77-79) ‘ 으약으E E트rc르.p.!.브n experirnents 
revealed no demonstrab1e corre1atíon between the spectrum of 1íght ref1ected from 
。bjects and the colors we perceive as an intrinsic property of their surfaces , but a 
remarkab1e mechanism through which the experíence of co1or ís created (Brou , 
Scíascías , Línden and Lettvín , 1986). So-ca11ed co1or í11usíons aríse from a 
mistaken conception of visions as a kind of optical system for accurately 
representing what is in front of someone ’ s eyes. New research on the neural 
。rganizati。n of perceptíon strong1y suggests that whatever we see ís 1arge1y 
generated from wíthín the brain , the product of actíve , íteratiγe and 
semi-antonomous cognitive processes that have a life of their OWTI. The circular 
construction of realities largely evolves from their own history of construction , 
。ccasíona11y perturbed by sensatíons from the outside (after Vare1a , 1984). 1 
mentíon bío1ogica1 ínsíghts here because of the wídespread re1íance on photographíc 
metaphors for exp1aíníng vísíon wíth the c1aím ímp1íed that we manípu1ate pictoría1 
representations of an existing reality in our brain. Such conceptions are unable t。
account for what seems to be a uníque feature of human cognítíon: the autonomy of 
its constructions under constituionally unknowable pertubations. 
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In socio1ogy , the idea that know1edge is socia11y constructed and governed by 
processes that result frorn the collective hístory of these constructions is not new 
Howeγer ， the ear1y proponents of this socio1ogy of know1edge , Berger and L냐ckrnann 
(1966) for examp1e , carefu11y 1irnit their concern t。 흐으으츠효조 rea1ity which has a 
history of being seen as superimposed and defined on top of a material reality , 
Marx ’ s notion of ideological superstructure , for example , thus avoiding the íssue of 
how deep this construction penetrates hurnan existence. Recent studies in social 
psychology (Gergen and Davis , 1985; Harre , 1986) go further and suggest that hurnan 
ernotions , which we cornrnon1y think to be bio1ogica1 , instinctive and hence 
involuntary in nature , are the very product of cognitive constructions and have a 
social history of their own , rornantic love , its suddenness , its physiological 
arousa1 , for examp1e having been invented no rnore than 700 years ago (Averi11 , 
1985). Even se1f ‘ consciousness , the practice of self-ascription of perception and 
action and the "crown" of human cognition may not be 50 natural either as we like t。
be1ieve ‘ According to Ju1ian Jaynes (1982) , it may have been invented by the Greeks 
sometime between the cornposition of the 프열연 and the 쁘~. There seems to be n。
doubt , we very much live in , feel , and act upon our own constructed realities , just 
as the Zen-monks did , but are scientists an exception? 
1 be1ieve the foregoing is genera1izab1e to scientific pursuits as we11. In 
fact , as social scientists we naturally assume considerable freedorn in develop i-ng 
theories , in deriving from them hypotheses and po1icy recommendations and applying 
them to experiments and work with subjects. The history of cornrnunication research 
is not so much about communication but about creative scholars , about researchers 
ta1king to each other and p1aying with ideas , about intellectua1 circ1es that forrn 
around particu1ar theories or rnethodo1ogies and break up when the workings of that 
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theory or methodology seem exhausted or about social institutions in need of certaín 
kind of knowledge. In other words , the frequent revisions in the organization of 
scientific knowledge 5eems related 1esB to the "1andscape" it claims to depict than 
to the nature of the cornmunity of inquiring scientists. Even A1bert Einstein , wh。
。therwise believed in the existence of a single and consistent universe ("nature 
does not play games ll ) , frequently emphasized that the unvierse we see is constructed 
by creative scientists and that such constructions unquestionab1y EE르드르브르 
。bservations:
We now know that science cannot grow out of ernpiricism alone , that in the 
constructions of science we need to use free invention which onlv a 
E으st르E츠으E호 can be confronted with experience as to its usefulnes능 This 
fact cou1d e1ude ear1ier generations , to whom theoretica1 creation seemed 
to grow indirect1y out of empiricism without the creative inf1uence of a 
free construction of concepts. The more primitive the status of science 
is the more readi1y can the scientist 1ive under the i11usion that he is a 
pure empiricist. (Pais , 1982: 14) 
The 효 얀프프 nature of scientific constructions is also c1aimed in other 
criticism of the estab1ished paradigm which , as we said , is founded on the be1ief 
that observations are neutral to competing theories , form the sole basis on which 
scientific know1edge is to be constructed and thus provide the u1timate contro1s for 
what we may know for sure. According to Danie1 0 ’ Keefe , who is specifica11y 
addressing issues of communication research J criticisrn of the estab1ished view 
rnaintains 
that observations are inherently "theory-laden ," that Ufacts ll are not 
facts independent of a conceptua1 (theoretica1) framework and thus that 
there is no theory-independeñt observation 1anguage. As Hanson (1958) 
puts it , Useeing is a ’ theory-laden' undertakingU-and thus "there is more 
to seeing than meets the eyeba11". (0 ’ Keefe , 1975) 
In his review of Ne1son Goodman ’ s W르y!!. 으￡ 띤으E조브 언효k츠~ (1978) W.V.O. Quine 
。bserved that physical theory is "ninety-nine parts conceptualization to one part 
。bservation ，" and concludes that this would rnake "nature" a poor candidate for the 
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"real" world (cited from Bruner , 1986 ’ 100). Obvious1y considerations other than an 
independent1y constituted rea1ity governs theory construction even in physics and 
probab1y more so in the social sciences. 1 am suggesting not only that a good deal 
。 f these ninety-nine percent conceptualizations is currently accounted for hy 
paradigrnatic commitrnents to the received naturalistic paradigrn but moreover that 
this commitment is a1so unconscionable. By making an objectiγe and 
。bserγer-independent reality the principal ruler over the constitutíon of scientific 
know1edge , 쁘츠프 쁘띤핀쁘드 엎쁘약g핀 츠묘 약릎으프 쁘프브르효 뜨프므브뜨s f프띤 뜨핀~ 
responsibi1itv 효E 쁘단r c。nstructions. Indeed , how could a scientist be b1amed for 
finding or discovering something when one be1ieγes that someone e1se , nature or god , 
has put it there to begin with? How could a scientist be held responsible for 
mere1y describing something when one be1ieves that a description is independent of 
what it describes and merely pictures what others could see as we11? 
One can not deny that the naturalist paradigm has served the scientific 
community well. Its claim that scientific practice is value-free and neutral in 
effect has enabled the institution of science to survive political and religious 
upheavals but it is this very paradigm that has made science into an unreflected 
generator of potentially dangerous forces in society. The aesthetical imperative 1 
am proposing here aims to turn the determinism around , make scientists aware of 
their own creativity in constructing the realities we will all have to live with and 
to enable them to take responsibility for their constructions. The psychological 
and political consequences of this irnperative are , 1 believe , profound 
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For example , a11 scientific knowledge has social consequences ‘ Those wh。
generate and cornmunicate scientific knowledge ought not to hide behind the facade of 
an objective reality they in effect build and then disown , but to assume 
responsibílity for its construction. Speaking as a member of the scientific 
community , it is we who have to take rsponsibilitV 프E 쁘르 핀쁘 약 뜨쁘쁘브gy that 
follows from our theoretical propositions. B.F. Skinner is responsible for the 
deterministic teaching machines and reinforcement prograrns that emerged from his 
theories , reducing man to a stimulus-response device. We have to take 
responsibilitY!.으r t뾰 k핀브 약 institution~ our research findings support or help 
develop. Administrative mass communication research is responsible for "improving !l 
media control of large audiences. We ought to be able to decide against creating 
theories that favour the interest of a ruling minority (fascist governments , for 
example). We have to take IesponsibilitV 효E 쁘트 k핀브 약 핀꿇트 약 띤효므 we portray in 
。ur theories of human communication and of human participation in social affairs 
Sigmund Freud is responsible for having invented a basically hydraulic model of the 
human psyche , with its drives , repressive mechanisrns , magnitudes of feelings , 
childhood determinism that has little place for human creative self-determination 
and , although largely outdated , still controls how people think , see and talk about 
themselves including how judges make decisions in the courts. Had another theory 
taken hold of the conceptual vacuum that existed in Freud ’ s times , we would 
presumably see ourselves differently today. Finally , it is we who have to take 
responsibilitV 프E 쁘르 팍므브 으￡ 얀띤논뾰트 that can be generated frorn the paradigm we 
choose to work under. All of these responsibilities can be claimed only if one 
realizes the freedom the aesthetical imperative asserts. 
The need to take responsibility for our theoretical constructions is 
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particu1ar1y important in the socia1 sciences where theories are 1arge1y subject t。
reifications including institutionalizations. Social theories are about people and 
peop1e are 1ike1y to respond to them , either by opposing them or by conforming t。
them , rendering them either inγa1id or making them truer thereby. Ethnic 
stereotypes , se1f-fu1fi11ing hypotheses or certain princip1es of effective 
management ( e.g. , the Hawthorne effect) are of this kind. 1 mentioned the theories 
。 f Freud and Skinner which have become truer the more they are pub1ished or 
converted into technology. 1 shall address some communication notions later. 
1 want to mention that the view expressed 50 far is not entirely rny own but , 1 
believe , consistent with Jean Piaget ’ s (1970) , Heinz von Foerster ’ s (1981 , (Sega1 , 
1986)) , Ernst von G1asersfe1d (1981) , Ne1son Goodman ’ s (1978 , 1984) , Jerome Bruner ’ s 
(1986) and re1ated to various 1ess radica1 forms of socia1 constructivism , for 
examp1e Kenneth Gergen ’ s (1985) , Luthar Berger and Thomas Luckmann ’ s (1966) , and 
Luckmann ’ s (1983) inc1uding perhaps Jesse De1ia ’ s (1977). The wording of the 
aesthetical imperative is in fact a rephrase of von Foerster ’ s: "If you desire t。
see , 1earn now to act" (1981:308). 
맨트 g뾰프프효조 I뾰뜨략브트 
The attribute "aesthetical" was deliberately chosen to allow considerations of 
beauty , the cognitive1y grounded p1easing of the senses without strings attached. 
But by itse1f , this imperative might sme11 of solipsism , the belief that everyone 
makes up , lives in and is indeed in the center of his own world. The empirical 
imperative aims to limit the arbitrariness of constructed realities without making 
references to a structured world before we know. It calls for an active exploration 
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。f the constraints experienced in the act of construction: 
INVENT AS MANY ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS AS YOU CAN 
AND ACT TO EXPERIENCE THE CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR VIABILITY. 
With this imperative 1 am suggesting that viab1e constructions say nothing 
about a reality. external to us except when they fai1 in 50me respect and that we 
shou1d therefore active1y strive to exp10re the 1imits beyond which constructions 
become non-viable and can then no longer serve 'as premises for action. Inforrnation 
1ies in this negative form. Going back to our Zen-story , whi1e it is obvious that 
the three monks share very 1itt1e of what is dramatized therein , it is equa11y c1ear 
that t뇨g프트 츠프 프으 misunderstanding whatsoever. 깐16 traγe11er experiences that he 
10st the debate and moves on. The younger brother is insu1ted and , having 
threatened his opponent , perfect1y understands why the trave11er wou1d want to 1eaγe 
the scene. After receiving the two reports of the dia1ogue , the older brother a1s。
understands why the stranger 1eft and his brother is angry. From each monk ’ s 
perspective , cornmunication was perfect , unambiguous , answered a11 relevant 
questions , terminated with one of several expected outcomes and none of the rnonks 
had experienced any reason to revise their constructions within the context of their 
experiences. All three rather different constructions therefore remained viable in 
the sense that they did not make their beho1der run into difficu1ties 
However , had the debate been continued with words , had the older brother 
intervened , in other words , had the two rnonks been able to see themselves in a 
context 1arger than ca11ed for by the si1ent debate , most 1ikely one or both of them 
wou1d have experienced prob1ems with ho1ding on to their high1y idiosyncratic 
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dialogue constructions. Any inability to understand , explain , predict or make sense 
of a situation indicates the n。 n-viability of a construction and always 초효 으으므프트즈트 
bound. The experience of misunderstanding in cornmunication i8 a case of this. A 
pathological response to this is to keep the construction , to narrow the context t。
where it applied successfully , consider the larger context incomprehensible or crazy 
and leave the paradoxical scene. This is what Heisenberg ’ s Uncertainty Principle 
has done to science in effect ‘ The empirical imperatiγe suggests instead that 
non-γiable constructions be actively sought and rejected or replaced by new , 
not-yet-proven-faulty constructions. As it were , the two rnonks neither made an 
effort to do something that would challenge their conceptions nor did they receive 
clues from each other that would force them to reject the understanding they had 
achieved. The debate remained within a context in which their constructions proved 
viable. 
One might argue that the " external realityll , whatever that may be , always i8 lI a 
poor communicator. n It knows only one message. It says either IINO" to a 
construction--when its predictions fai1 , or when the actions it calls for don ’ t 
yield expected perceptions --or it says "NOTHING at all." From Unothing U or "no 
comment" one can not possible infer anything about the validity , adequacy or 
correspondence of a construction and something else , and this " some thing else" can 
therefore never "reveal its" structure. The empirical imperative merely calls 
。bservers to continuously generate new constructions or to expand , elaborate and 
combine existing ones in order to bring forth the experience of constraints on the 
freedom to construct them at will. Without stipulating what viable constructions 
might represent it suggests regarding them just as what they are: not yet proven 
faulty. 
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Gregory Bateson (1972) anticipated this irnperative by linking its negative forrn 
。f reasoning to processes of evolution. In biology , evolution does not favour the 
fittest (which 1s a popular misinterpretation of Darwin's theory eγen though he 
hirnself was responsib1e for this slippage) but se1ective1y e1irninates those 
。rganisms that cannot survive the interaction with their environment. Those 
surviving may ha-γe features that have been adaptive ti11 now but rnay we11 turn out 
to fai1 thern in the future. They rnay have a1so features that are tota1ly irre1eγant 
for survival , mere creative variations of no consequence. Evolution says nothing 
about future advantages of anything. A11 we can say is that the organisrns of a 
species that do survive possess none of the features that have prevented it from 
existing throughout its history of lnteractlon in its particular environment. 
Bateson 1inked the theory of evo1ution to cybernetic forrns of exp1anation which are 
negative in that they exp1ain why certain constructions are not tenab1e but say 
nothing about why not-yet-pr。γen-non-viable constructions work. 
The ernpirica1 irnperatiγe can a150 be seen as a radical generalization of Karl 
Popper ’ s (1959) Fa1sification Criterion. Concerned with how genera1izations rnay be 
supported by ernpirica1 evidence he p1ain1y conc1udes they cannot. There never are 
enough data avai1ab1e to support a theory but a1ready few rnay reject it. 
Recognizing this , Popper suggests that verification ( empirica1 support for the 
truth-va1ue of a theory) is not possible and that fa1sification 1ies at the heart of 
the scientific procedure. Positivists after hirn have accepted the irnpossibi1ity of 
estab1ishing the degree of correspondence between a theory or hypothesis and the 
ernpirical evidence it claims to describe but interpreted "non-falsified" 
constructions as "co r roborated" or as "implicity verified ll which Popper did not 
intend. A1though Popper ’ s fa1sification criteria did not rnanage to cha11enge the 
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estab1ished paradigm , it c1ear1y makes no c1aim as to what , if anything 
non-fa1sifiab1e theories describe. This point is echoed in Dona1d Campbe11 ’ s (1974) 
"Evo1utionary Episterno1ogy" , Peter Skagestad ’ s (1978) seque1 and in Ernst von 
G1aserfe1d ’ s (1981) work. 
A logical consequence of the ernpirical imperative i5 the radical abandonment of 
the belief that constructions , theories , hypotheses or practical guides for action 
must describe something accurate1y (in the sense of a referential theory of 
1anguage) , particularly an externa11y existing rea1ity. Viab1e constructions are 
what they are , speak entire1y for themselves and should not be taken as depicting 
something. von G1asersfeld used the ana10gy of a key in a 10ck to describe the fit 
between a construction and what it does. There may be many keys that would open the 
lock but there are a1so some that don ’ t. The key does not describe the 10ck it 
。pens
Arnong the conceptual consequences of the empirical irnperative 1s the rejection 
。f 연없프브르 쁘또프g 효흐 르 뜨프뜨프E 쁘E 뿔으브 c。mmunicati。~. Cognitive sharing in 
the sense of same , similar or overlapping cognitive representations between 
communicators is first of a11 difficu1t to estab1ish. We can't simp1y open up 
someone's brain without destroying what we wish to observe and if we could , we would 
face the prob1em of not knowing how to identify the pattern of neurona1 activity t。
which these cognitive representations supposed1y refer. In the Zen-story , the tw。
debating monks knew perfectly we11 how the dia10gue went and a11 they had seen about 
each other became part of their own construction and a premise for their action 
Even 80 the older brother could see differences in the two accounts , these would 
have been his own constructions had the story to1d us what they were. On1y if he 
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wou1d have c1aimed privi1edged access to the two monks brains cou1d he have become a 
judge and decide who was right or what they had in common , but he did not and this 
is part of the story. 1 am suggesting that the concept of cognitive sharing is a 
socia1 myth imported by the positivistic paradigm into human communication theory 
(and practice?) and unethica1 for two reasons: first , it supports authority c1aims 
based on either privi1edged access to a singu1ar rea1ity in which over1apping 
conceptíons or cognitive similarities could be ascertained objectively or the power 
to interprete their own constructions as valid representations of the constructions 
he1d by others. Second., it supports the idea of communication as unilatera1 or 
。ne-way contro1. According1y , communication wou1d be judged successfu1 if a sender 
manages to get his(her point across to a receiver and makes this receiγer do , think 
。r desire what s (he intended himjher to by that sender ’ s measures. From this 
position , the two monks would appear to not have communicated at a11 even 50 neither 
of them wou1d have agreed had one asked them separate1y. A1though contro1 notions 
。 f communication are indeed practiced , and many social institutions frorn adγertising 
to totalitarian governments thrive on it , for the study of human commuTI1cation the 
normative implications of this view are unnecessarily restrictive and in its 
exclusiγity oppresive. Anthony Wa11ace (1961) comes to the same conc1usion when he 
shows cognitive sharing to be neíther a necessary condition for society nor a 
desirab1e feature of cu1ture and of human communication. He suggests 
c。mp1ementarity as a better criterion for good communication , and indeed the tw。
debators ’ cognitive systems seem to fit 1ike hand in glove , 1ike key in 10ck or 1ike 
two neighboring pieces of a jigsaw puzzle , visibly touching each other at the 
fringes of their constructed interfaces. There is no need to invoke the image of 
cognitive sharing here and then show how 1itt1e they did. 
As a footnote , 1 rnight point to another sense of sharing to which the above 
does not apply. This is the sense invoked when someone sees someone e1se as 
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separate but belonging to the sarne whole. This always is sorneone ’ s self-involγíng 
part-whole construction and rnight not be cognitively shared by the involved other ’ s 
part-whole construction 
The Self-Referential 핀E료E효단쓰르 
The self-referential imperative 1s most directly in conflict with the second 
positivist premise and suggest: 
INCLUDE YOUR SELF AS A CONSTlTUENT OF YOUR OWN CONSTRUCTIONS 
1 have shown some limits of the existing paradigrn and rnust now show why the virtual 
reversal of its premise 18 essential to my alternative 
Let me begin by stating the obvious that cornrnunication scholars , whether their 
intellectual roots are in the hurnanities , in the social sciences or in technology 
can never escape participation in the culture they grew up in , observe , theorise 
about , interact with and change. We derive our problems from this participation , 
solve them with the instrurnents we acquired frorn others and feed the knowledge we 
generate back to the context in which the problern arose and to which it might be 
applied. Participati。n 프 으프띤브E 쁘브 츠쁘약프트프 쁘 프프 쁘뜨 약 쁘츠프 으프약e. The 
circle may be small when we apply our knowledge to ourselves to becorne better 
communicators , more effective teachers or rnore aware of human relationships. The 
circle is large when our contribution to knowledge is deerned useful by students , 
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published and read by others , he1pful to so1ving socia1 prob1ems or instrumenta1 t。
the institutions that ultimately reward us with status and research faci1ities. T。
capture these genera1ities conceptua11y requires us to deve10p constructions that 
include our own constructions as constitutive parts. 
One may appreciate the difficu1ties of recursive theory construction when one 
is asked to describe a map that includes the maker of the map which must therefore 
include the cognitive map the map maker has of the map he is making which of course 
contains the map of the map of the map , etc. Se1f-reference easi1y 1eads into an 
infinite regression in which 쁘르 약뜨핀뜨프E 쁘댄뾰므 쁘트 띤효E 쁘브 프E 띤략르E 
브호흐효El'.료르프프 호므 the .l'.!:으드르프프 으효 핀효El'.츠므g. Th is is precise1y what the se1f-referentia1 
imperative imp1ies. Observers who , by acting on an 。이 ect , observe that object as 
acted upon and who in response to the construction of what they experience , further 
act upon the object observed , ultimate1y end up seeing themse1γes in the object they 
haγe been making 
Historica11y , the reason for exc1uding observers from their domain of 
。bservation was not mere1y an arbitrary fixation. It had its root in the inabi1ity 
to cope with the vicious circularity and infinite regression just described. 
Wh itehead and Russe11 (1910) imp1icit1y admitted this inability by inventing their 
injunctive Theory of Logical Types. However , this situation has changed thanks t。
Goede1 ’ s (1962) proof , von Foerster ’ s (1981) ca1cu1us of infinite regression and the 
theory of Eigen behaviors , G. Spencer-Brown ’ s (1979) 논앨효 으f F약핀 and Francisc。
Vare1a ’ s (1975) ca1cu1us of se1f-reference. A11 point to different so1utions of 
what was before seen as problems rooted in self-reference 
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Before e1aborating on the epistemo1ogica1 imp1ication of this imperative let me 
move from the globa1 se1f-referentia1 circu1arity to the microcosm of our Zen-story 
We note there is a ruling presupposition. ulf the wandering rnonk wins a debate on 
Buddhism , he may stay at the temp1e." Th is 1imits the context of concern to that of 
a debate. In the three monks ’ constructions , the world outside this context and 
surrounding them is a1ready known to them , taken for granted or irre1evant to the 
debate that fo11ows. Initia11y , the two brothers and the stranger hard1y know each 
。ther and this 1ack of know1edge is neither bothersome to anyone nor of interest t。
the monastic 1ife. A11 that the dia10gue needs to make known is whether the 
stranger rnay stay at the ternp1e. This know1edge 11es in a finite sequence of 
alteractions. It 15 procedural and terminal , if you wish , and unrelated to what 
existed before the debate. During the debate the trave11er ’ 5 unfolding construction 
made the younger brother into the winner and the younger brother ’ 5 construction led 
him to experience the traveller as an insulting wretch. In the sequence of 
a1teractions the debators shaped different conceptions of their opponents that 
converged on two different but fu11y comp1ementary rea1ities of the debators ’ 。wn
making. 
Why wou1d particu1ar1y Heisenberg ’ s Uncertainty Princip1e suggest that this 
alteractive form of observation would not be amenable to scientific observation and 
measurement whereas the monks find it a perfect1y norrna1 procedure to gain know1edge 
。f each other? I think this again stems from the existing paradigm ’ s onto1ogy. The 
belief in an observer-independent reality makes it a natural task of science t。
obtain 프E효E르 description~ of what exists , the position and ve10city of partic1es in 
quantum physics , the attitudes of voters , the espoused theory of a socia1 
organization (Argyris and Schon , 1974). Heisenberg's princip1e sets a 1irnit to the 
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possibi1ity of obtaining state descriptions by observation from the outside. But if 
we are no 10nger interested in describing what exists (an airn Popper ’ s Falsifícation 
Criterion in its more radical forrn of our ernpirical imperative no longer pursues) 
and focus instead on 쁘트 뾰르면브띤프 으￡ 브프므일므g 으nes 으쁘 엎뾰프프낀면프 드으 효 뾰으프프E 
E으츠nt ， as the rnonks in fact did , then Heisenberg ’ s principle is no longer 
app1icab1e. In a very irnportant sense the se1f-referentia1 irnperatiγe forces us 
into a circular alteraction and in trying to gain insights under these conditions we 
make what we want to know or at least influence or contribute to these creations and 
thus 뾰 표E 쁘E브 뜨쁘트 쁘브 댄쁘면뾰쁘효 으￡ 쁘효t w르 쁘똑프트 
The condition of being both cause and consequence of observation is cornmon to 
nurnerous socia1 situations and it is on1y the power of the existing paradigrn that 
has prevented scientists from connecting their own actions to the observations 
caused by thern and frorn coming to grips with 10nger sequences of such se1f-effecting 
conditions. Even when we app1y a questionnaire to find out what peop1e think we 
can ’ t help but interact with the interviewees , raise their awareness about the 
questions asked , focus their attention to sornething that rnay not haγe occurred t。
them and force thern to decide among a1ternatives that may be a1ien to their 
thinking. Nicho1as Bateson (1984) right1y suggested that we do not co11ect surγey 
data but we construct them. Much more obvious situations are therapeutic 
interventions in which therapists 1earn about their patients as they interact with 
them , attempting to change their attitudes or behavior at the same time. Decision 
making in rnanagement too can usua11y not wait for ha、ring co11ected a11 data and then 
grind them through an optimizing ca1cu1us. A typica1 inquiry process in management 
may start with initia11y blind actions and yield some information in return , 
continues with someψhat more informed actions and yie1ds further information in 
return , etc. and is more likely to resemble psychiatric interaction than línear 
causal information processes. 
1 want to rnention one methodological implication and three conceptual 
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。pportunities. From a methodological point of view it will be important to shift 
gears from the discovery and description of states to the engagement of operations 
in a process of interaction. In this process the starting position ís usually 1ess 
important and often unknown indeed than its convergence towards some equilibrium or 
Eigen Behavior which is stable under the repeated applications of the very operation 
that brings this process about. In fact when stability 1s reached the log1cal 
difference between the operation and the operand , the obserγer and the observed , the 
map maker and the map or even the psychiatrist and the client (as conceptualized by 
either one in relation to the other) becomes no longer distinguishable and 
disappears into stable "objects" or concepts of which the beholder is an active 
part. To realize this in our research practice requires a new set of procedures for 
data construction and analysis. 
Among the circular constructions encouraged by the self-referential imperatiγe 
is 쁘면므으띤y. Conceptual1y , autonomy means self-government and operational1y 
involves a network of communication among the parts of a system whose behavior is 
constituted entirely in terms of that network of partic1pating components. The 
self-reference in this notion of autonomy 1s again obγious. To constitute means t。
define from within and it is a mark of autonomous system that their organization 
cannot be explained in terms of agents , causes , controls , governors from its 
outside. The positivistic paradigm which requires the distinctions between cause 
and consequence , dependent and independent variables , definiens and definiendum , 
controller and controlled , cannot describe much 1ess see the scientist involved ín 
an autonomous system which i8 operationally closed 
In our Zen-story , the constructions that co-emerge within the two debatíng 
monks are autonornous. Through the older brother we know that the debate converges 
in the knowledge of whether the stranger is welcome or must leaγe. But how the 
monks proceed to construct each others qualifications and the nature of the 
realities that appear in their final report seerns explainable frorn nowhere other 
than from the alteraction of a debate that directs its own progression. 
The second concept 1 want to tie to the self-referential irnperative is 
self-realization. It shares its prefix with the above mentioned self-government 
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(-autonomy) , self-determination , self-organization , self-production (-autopoiesis) , 
self-reflection (-introspection) , etc. In human terrns , self-realization i5 the use 
。f ones own potential to constitute oneself in the context of others , the ability t。
make oneself distinct. However , this process can only be seen as the property of a 
construction involving the self in communication with other people and in 
interaction with other things that converge as it unfolds towards an increasingly 
complementary circularity and towards an increasingly distinct self. Any 
explanation of self-realization in terms of innate properties of the organism 
(Chomsky regarding language) , in terms of responses to stimuli (B.F. Skinner ’ s 
behaviorism) , in terrns of modes of production (Marx ’ s historical determinism) , in 
terrns of early aquired drives (Freud's psychological determinisrn) contradicts the 
very notion of self-realization and 1 might echo Juergen Haberrnas ’ suggestion that 
Freud with his very invention of psychological determinisms deserted and destroyed 
his own idea of psychoanalysis as a process in which an individual realizes what 
s (he is. The self-referential imperative allows if not encourages the liberation 
from unilateral external determinisms. 
1 cannot help but rnention the possibilities of constructing Gregory Bateson ’ s 
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(1979) notion of 띤츠E브 which would be an inconceivable undertaking within positivisrn. 
Translating his ideas freely , the brain contains a complex of loops accounting for 
the tremendously creative , active and autonomous role of cognition in the 
construction and computation of realities (which may be thought of as 10cated within 
the brain to start out with). But the nervous systern is a1so open and can connect 
itself with the circuitries of a great variety of environments with which it 
interacts and through which it becornes at least partially closed. The circularity 
that emerges (involving parts of the brain and parts of the environment) develops 
its own wisdom and converges towards stable multi-verses each with its own circuity , 
interfaces and complernentarities. Mind , suggests Bateson , is not a property of the 
brain but of the circuits in which it may take part. There is mind in cognition but 
also possibly in society , ecology and nature. Self-referential loops are its basic 
units. 
댄e Ethical 1맥뜨효단ve 
The three imperatives so far giγen enable scientific observers to assume 
responsibility for their own creations , call on them to strive to experience the 
non-viability of their constructions and suggest that they include thernselves in 
them thus operationalizing notions of autonomy , self-realization and mind. But 
under these conditions communication may still be essentially rnonologue with other 
communicators playing a complementary but possibly inferior role in the 
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se1f-referentia1 circ1e , 10gic may sti11 be mono-1ogíc with each communícator 
capab1e of occupyíng superior posítions in theír own mu1tí-verse. The two debatíng 
monks could have been as far apart as a martian and a dolphin , each perceiving the 
。ther as an object , as a machine-like creation , that he rnay shape in the process of 
gainíng understanding of himse1f in re1atíon to others. Remarkab1y , the two monks 
did not consider their own constructed realities as one of many possible ones and 
much 1ess did they ref1ect on the constructions emp10yed by theír opponents. 
Standard methodology in communication research is notorious for al10wing 
scientists to create any research ídea , any new theory they may wish to put to test 
。r any new experiment , survey or content analysis that might yield the desired 
evidence , whi1e at the same time regarding the observed subjects , the people that 
cou1d have been and may in fact be scientists in their own right , as input-output 
devices whose variables need to be associated , corrrelated , explained , predicted or 
accounted for. De1ia (1977) correct1y labe1ed the type of research this tradition 
favours 안효프쁘조르 뜨흐르효뜨뇨" But what is real1y underlying these constructions is 
the fundamenta1 inequa1ity in the conception of scientific observers and observed 
subjects. This inequality in cognitive capacity c1aimed by us for ourselves and 
denied to our subjects is staggering and borders on institutional oppression. On a 
sma11 sca1e , Rita Atwood and her students (1984) noticed this when trying t。
interview women on how the image of women in teleγision had changed. Starting with 
an elahorate set of content analysis categories , they were soon confronted with the 
experience that the interviewees themse1ves had much more e1aborate and detai1ed 
conceptions than the researchers had at their disposa1. This fundamenta1 inequa1ity 
is a1so under1ying much of the justified criticism of western socia1 research 
app1ied to deve10ping countries. For examp1e , when a survey of a Turkish vi1lage is 
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designed far away at Harvard University , when an army of trained interviewers 
sudden1y descends on that vi11age , without warning , so as to keep the vi11age in a 
"natural state" and the villagers from talking to each other about the survey , and 
when the data are then f10wn back to Boston to be ground through a sophisticated 
computer that assigns each vil1ager to a point in a multidimensional space in which 
their own creativity and knowledge 1s irrecoverably burried J the results can not 
possib1y revea1 anything other than what the designers of the study wanted to hear , 
making creative participation of the subjects impossib1e 
In what has become known as Participatory Research or as one of my students put 
it "Socia11y Shared Inquiry" (A1fonso , 1983) , this inequa1ity has become the , target 
。f a conscious effort to reform1ate basic research assumptions. Pau10 Freire (1972 , 
1974) maintains that the ro1e of those committed to this form of inquiry is not t。
fabricate 1iberating ideas and bring them into a community but to invite people to 
creatively participate in a process that irrγ。 lves above all an understanding 
(conscientization) of the reality in which these people live. In such a research 
effort subjects are recognized as having minds of their own and are al10wed t。
participate ín a process of comrnunication that ends up in knowledge about themselves 
as individuals and as a community 
1 maintain that both scientists and ordinary human beings have the capacity t。
participate in social realities of their joint construction. These realities may be 
different in content but not in that they ought to recognize each individual ’ s 
ability to think , to construct their own realities , to act and to communicate about 
them with each other. Therefore the principles of communication should be 
applicab1e to the individuals we theorize about as well as to our own process of 
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comming to know about them. 
1 might mention in passing the well meaning efforts of ethno-methodology ‘ 
While probably rnost fair to the collective realities constructed by an indiginous 
population , it does not include the observer in that description and thereby 
describes these realities from the outside and tends to exclude communication 
between the observer and the observed. 
Views of Observer~Observed Relations (first three from Sal mond , 1982) 
STRL.C TURAlISM 
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Observer Observed 
Figure 2 
The preceeding provides a point of departure for the ethical irnperative 1 am 
proposíng. When two individuals meet , observe each other and communicate with each 
。 ther ， just like the two rnonks did , it is possible for each comrnunicator to regard 
the other as a mere vehicle through which each realizes himse1f and maintains his 
superior and self-cent~red position. 먼트 쁘프단많 면뜨약멜 면뜨랙h 프프 얀막프르프 쁘효 
쁘꽉E 막프 핀역뾰브!.y 핀E으 프프 으쁘 뾰쁘역약않y. 1 am suggesting that the 
pervasiveness of this paradigrn , eγen in every-day 1ife , leads us to deve10p 
cornmunication 쁘쁘갚약 and app1y them to our own world in 찌ays that 뜨프X 쁘프 
프연묘략프X 
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However , when two individuals cornmunicate with each other about their position 
(a situation whích the naturalist scientist cannot become involved at least not 
within the context of socia1 inquiry) then it is no 10nger possib1e for both to be 
superior to the other 효쁘 to remain in the center of their own reality. What ís 
vio1ated by such comrnunication is what von Foerster (1981:307) ca11s the Princip1e 
。f Re1ativity , which ca11s for the rejection of a hypothesis that ho1ds for each of 
two separate instances but not for both of them together. According1y , as soon as 
an observer , who c1aims for himse1f the autonomy of constructing his rea1itγ ， 
invents another observer who claims the 8ame autonorny for hirnself , the forrner can n。
longer remain singularly autonomous. Hence , the 약판덮조 핀쁘뜨브쁘 : 
GRANT OTHERS THAT OCCUR IN YOUR CONSTRUCTIONS 
THE SAME AUTONOMY YOU PRACTICE IN CONSTRUCTING THEM. 
Interesting1y , Marxist theory of know1edge is entang1ed in the kind of 
inequa1ities this imperative attempts to aγ。id. One such inequality can be seen in 
the fo11owing paradox: A cornerstone of Marx ’ s thinking is that a11 know1edge is 
biased by the ideo1ogy of its beho1der and its surface meaning can therefore never 
be trusted. This seems p1ausib1e and has served critica1 theory we11. However it 
can be accepted as referentia11y true on1y if the statement does not app1y to its 
originator or be1iever who must have (had) the unbiased access to the facts which 
are denied to a11 others. The statement is true for a11 know1edge on1y if some 
know1edge is exc1uded. Russe11 ’ s Theory of Logica1 Types reso1ves this paradox by 
making Marxists into superior observers and those to whorn the statement applies int。
dupes. The ethica1 imperative is in a sense radica11y ega1itarian and suggests that 
the statement shou1d be app1ied to Marx ’ s assertions as we11. It makes sense on1y 
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if its generality and its self-reference is taken to its consequences 
1 am claiming that the acceptance of the ethical imperative by the participants 
in a social process 뜨프s c。mmunicati。n 핀뜨 브프브앞르 One conceptual consequence 
。f this imperative is that it enables the modelling of one of the most fundamenta1 
bases of meaningfu1 socia1 re1ationships: 뜨~뜨 and 면쁘쁘y ， --not as a separate 
variable to be correlated with communication success , but as a property of the very 
constructions within which dialogue occurs. Another is that even the simple 
alteractive notions of communication do not suffice and must be replaced by 
recursive reality constructions in which the multi-verse of one communicator is 
embedded in the multi-verse of the other. The infinite regress this entails is 
resolved by a process that one might call dialoguing. It does not entail aims like 
to convince , to manipulate or to control , it rather means being together in mutual 







Figure 3 serves to compare the received scientific observation of others with 
the kind of processes the aesthetical , self-referential and ethical imperatives d。
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suggest. With its commitment to a single and independently observed reality and t。
an exclusively (operationally defined) referential language , the naturalist obserγer 
of someone e1se is encouraged to represent that other as an ohserved object to be 
analyzed as something quite apart frorn that observer ’ 
Representation Observe(Object) 
This one-step application of the operation "Observe" is straight forward and simple 
In contrast and on the right side of this figure , the new paradigrn suggests that 
each observer engage in a circular process through which they understand or 
construct themselves in relation to 80me other observer(s) with constructive 
capabilities much as their own. In other words and to initiate the process , a first 
approximation to the Self-construct is obtained by observing (or applying the 
。peration "0bserve" to) a Self and its Other: 
Self-construct1 Obserγe(Self+Other) 
and this would be as far as the self-referential imperative would go. 
However , if this Self and that Other is realized as nothing but a construct 
which is derived as such from the history of observing interactions with others , we 
find a second approximation to the Self-construct to involve the operation "Observe" 
applied twice to itself and the other 
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Self-construct2 ~Observe(Self-construct 1 ,Other-construct 1) 
Observe(Observe(Self+Other)+Observe(Other+Self)) 
In the continuíng ínteraction between obserγers ， their respective selves and others 
are repeatedly and interactively reconstructed and thus becorne the product of an 
iterative sequence of embedded operations in which the original self and the 
。riginal other disappears in the background while bringing in view the recursiγe 
process of observation which , under the constraints included in the empirical 
imperative , is exactly what construction entails. Hence: 
Construction Observe(Observe( ... Observe(Self+Other) ... )) 
and taking one observation in time if follows that: 
Construction Observe(Construction) 
。 r:
Construction Constructing Constructíons. 
The process and product direct each other within the constraints alerted to by the 
empirical imperative. 
The methodological consequences of these imperatives are beginning to emerge in 
the kind of participatory research in which the members of a communitγ are engaged 
in dialogue that results in the increased competence of the community to understand 
itself , to develop and revise as deemed needed its own col1ective realities , leaving 
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room for its members to create their own complementary constructions and to realíze 
themselves in them. Researchers who accept the ethical imperative are more 
facilitators than experts who know by virtue of their position and training. They 
are participants who are committed to the process of dialoguing without assuming all 
the power to determine its direction. They possses the empathy that allows them t。
switch positions and see the world including themselves through someone elses ’ 
constructions. The ethical irnperative permits love to be part of the process 
The 쁘약화 민얄프단X르 
What happens noW to objectivity , the kind of unquestionable truthfulness of 
scientific insights on which modern society has buildits institutions , its 
technology and serves or is served hy its members? What can be relied upon , after 
the "fall" of the dominant paradigm which relied on this notion of truth? How does 
the challenging paradigm regard the wealth of knowledge that served us well 
historically? Let me sketch a possible answer which will then lead to my fifth and 
last imperative 
When one accepts the aesthetical irnperative and sees reality as constructed or 
inγented by an observer to see , the external reality on which naturalism relies and 
in which a positivistic observer finds or discovers "ínteresting things l1 t。
describe , must be seen as a construction or invention as wel1. It is used by those 
who are either unaware of their creative acts or unwilling to take responsibilitγ 
for their own creations. There are good reasons for the unawareness about the 
constructed nature of reality. The first is that 프 띤뾰 쁘 프략프E프nt t으 쁘뜨쁘트 
each time one wants to use a concept 쁘트 쁘약르 프E뜨또단으르 핀뜨약X 으￡ 프프 
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construction. Life is sometimes easier without that awareness. The separation of 
the philosophy of science , which raises , debates and makes an effort to sett1e 
issues of the genesis and acceptability of scientific explanations , frorn the 
practice of scientific inquiry conveniently delegates this awarenes to a specialized 
group within the academic community , thus freeing the ordinary researcher from 
having to dea1 with those issues ‘ The second reason is that scientific obserγers 
have inherited most of their concepts and procedures without the know1edge that they 
have been constructed by others , who may have 1ived many generations before them 
Being 뾰쁘쁘E브 효으핀 쁘르 얀약똑프 으￡ 뜨쁘단으므 (Berger and Luckmann , 1966) they can n。
10nger see what 1ead to them and therefore take the socia1 product as an 
unquestionab1e fact. The third reason is that construction does not take p1ace 
inside the observer a10ne. Communication is the interactive construction of 
realities including the communicators in them and has created such objects as 
language , technology and social institution which are no longer easily recognized as 
arbitrary or human constructions. They live a life of their own , often 으프뜨핀르 쁘르 
츠쁘브펀브략 프으프므단얀힘 쁘효펀력 약말프프，!!， and haγe perhaps therefore an apparently 
overwhe1ming existence that is difficult to grasp. These are not excuses for the 
lack of awareness but perhaps explanations. 
The reason for the unwillingness of scientists to take responsibility for their 
creations are complex and cannot be elaborated here except to say that willingness 
to take this responsibility presupposes an awareness of this possibility that is 
discouraged in the complicity between the naturalist paradigm and the institutional 
role of the western scientific enterprise. 
The view that the external reality is an invention implies that objectivity 
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must be an invention as well and one that is rooted in the very society in which the 
knowledge to be judged is also constructed and applied. Objectivity is thus 
involved in a self-referential circle of its own and subject to the dynamics 
inherent in this realizatíon. To merely replace the word "objectivity" by the word 
lI intersubjective agreement , " which connotes this social root , does not quite address 
the dynamics and the empirical constraints involved and 1 want to note this briefly 
by resolving the concept of agreement and of stability respectively. 
Under the existing paradigm two observers must first agree to look at the sarne 
thing before they can match their descriptions of it and resolve whether one or both 
have been duped by perceptual illusions or measurements biases. Thus agreement is 
involved even in the belief that a single reality rules supreme. It is difficult t。
conceive of objectivity without agreement. But what does the statement "1 agree 
with you" mean? How is it used? Strictly speaking , it can not mean the sharing of 
perceptions , thoughts or judgements for , as 1 have argued , there is no way of 
establishing whether two cognitive patterns are the same , similar or overlapping. 1 
am suggesting therefore that a statement of agreement , mutually affirmed , most 
likely indicates that two observers have each reached a satisfactory level of 
understanding or coherence in their own constructions , that the constructions we 
have of each other are no longer judged problematic , that neither is willing to put 
the potential non-viability of these construction to further tests , that there is 
adequate certainty in their "fit" , all of which would thus indicate a ~atisfactory 
level of c。mplementarity.
Except for short or interrupted encounters , all human communicatíon eventual1y 
converges towards complementary constructions whether the Eigen Behavior resulting 
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from these constructions is conflictual , harmonious or the adaptation to a jointly 
created technology. Complementarily entails a certain level of 뜨쁘프프X 약 
expectation~ in interaction with others at the experience of which the constructions 
involved are nO longer seen as a threat to each other ’ s viability and no longer need 
elaboration or adaptation. Complementarity implies a kind of self-evident closure 
and 1s invoked in a11 constructions that relate observers to each other via a medium 
including to the environment they share (in the sense of each seeing each other as 
parts of the same whole). Language , technology and social institutions have aquired 
such stabilities , provide the medium through which we see us communicating with each 
。ther and define our roles in these constructions , using such inventions as physical 
laws , linguistic rules , and social conventions to keep our constructions coherent 
and in place. Complementarity is probably the most important consequence of 
every-day human communication and of the process of scientific practice as well. 
In the new paradigm , 1 believe one must replace the received notion of 
。bjectivity but not by an unqualified search for complementarities (which may 
include objectivity as a special case). To appreciate the damages of an unqualified 
replacement one rnust realize first , the great variety of cognitiγe constructions 
human beings can invent , and the great variety of linguistic forms , technological 
structures and social institutions that could evolve and be tried. This variety ís 
far from being exhausted through our own history. One rnust also realize , second , 
the extraordinary reificative power of social theories. We know that predictions 
may effect what is predicted , communication theories may influence how people 
communicate with each other , theoríes of the unconscíous may create classífications 
and treatments of mental illness , political theories may institute new or erode old 
g。γernments ， etc. 1 say may , but if these theories are convincing they will come 
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true by reification. The kind of objectivity on which the positivistic paradigm 
relies has blinded social researchers from seeing reality as observer , dependent , as 
made to a significant extent by their individual or col1ective actions or as 
inγented and is thus r원뜨프단쁘 E프민 E프브프 the scientific enterprise. But 
published social theories wil1 have social consequences whether one wants it or not 
(even their public rejection can be regarded as such). Complementarities will 
emerge from convincingly presented knowledge and such complementarities can 
ultimately end up being re프드E초ctiv트 to scientific pursuits but from the outside 
They can stifel the very creatiγity that gave rise to them and retard the very 
humanness that they were meant to serve. What it boils down to is that the criteria 
we adopt to evaluate the construcions we introduce into our world ought not to yield 
stabilities without the assurance of continued freedom if not further liberation 
from historical oppressions. The fundamental property of dialogue is that it yields 
complernentarity (which giγes us structure and certainty) while protecting the 
creativity to reflect on and to 。γercome any inadequacies we are forced or choose t。
see in our constructions. On the level of scientific dialogue , (and I wouldn ’ t mind 
seeing it extended to all social situations) , 1 am suggesting the 프단략 츠뾰쁘약브르 
to read: 
IN COMMUNICATION WITH OTHERS , 
MAINTAIN OR EXPAND THE RANGE OF CHOICES POSSIBLE. 
The movie "My Dinner with Andre" contains a vivid description of the 
self-trapping qualities social conceptions and institutions can have , reifying 
itself through practice and converging toward a state of complementary fits from 
which it might no longer be conceivable to leave: 
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.. he said to me , "Where are you from?" And 1 said , "New York. 11 IIAh , New York , 
yes that ’ s a very interesting p1ace. Do you know a 10t of New Yorkers who keep 
ta1king about the fact that they want to 1eave , but never do?" And 1 said , 
"Oh , yes." And he said , "Why do you think they don ’ t leave?" And 1 gave him 
different bana1 theories. And he said "Oh , 1 don ’ t think it is that way at 
all. 1I ., .111 think that New York is the new model for the new concentration 
camp , where the camp has been bui1t by the inmates themse1ves , and the inmates 
are the guards , and they have this pride in this thing that they ’ ve 
buil t - - they ’ ve bui1t their own prison--and so they exist in a state of 
schizophrenia where they are both guards and prisoners. And as a resu1t they 
no 10nger have--having been 10botomized--the capacity to 1eave the prison 
they ’ve rnade or even to see it as a prison." And then he went into his pocket 
and he took Qut a seed for a tree , and he said , "This is a seed for a pine 
tree." And he put it in rny hand. And he said , "Escape before ít ’ s too late. 11 
(Shaw and Gregory .. 1981: 92-93) 
쁘E얀프딴!!，g 얻쁘약E 
Wh i1e the use of the word positivism or natura1ism has 1ate1y come in 
disrepute , its premises still permeate much of our social research , influence the 
1anguage we are using and through it the techno1ogy we are deve10ping and the 
institutions we are supporting. Received paradigmatic limits on scientific theory 
construction forces the social sciences to increasingly become socially irrelevant 
and to surrender contro1 of the fabric of our 1ives to an inacceptab1e metaphysics. 
But when one denies these premises , as 1 have done , turns them into their opposite 
or upside-down , as Marx might have said , one comes to the surprizing conclusion that 
there are possib1e wor1ds this a11-pervasive paradigm has prevented us from seeing , 
wor1ds we can co-construct and can take responsibi1ities for , wor1ds in which others 
have creative capabilities similar to our OWTI , worlds in which we can realize 
ourse1ves in re1ations to others , and wor1ds that may support the 1iberation from 
the history of metaphysica1 determinism without denying experientia1 constraints. 
Communication is central to all of these .worlds I not in the sense of control , 
which a positivist onto1ogy natura11y favours , but in the sense of dia1oguing , an 
。ngoing process that respects the autonomy of different rea1ity constructions , 
enab1es each participant to interrogate their own histories and grow beyond them 
Dia10gue probab1y is the most nob1e form of human interaction and communication 
scholars should be the first to appreciate its outstanding human qualities. 
1 1ike to .1eave the naming of this new paradigm to others. For Ernst von 
G1asersfe1d it is "radica1 constructivist" (1981). Since it can do without the 
meta-physica1 assωnption of a single experience-independent reality , 80me haγe 
called it IIrealist. 1I However , rnany ideas for this proposal , especially the 
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self-referential and ethical imperatives , come from modern cybernetics , which has 
always understood itself to be a science of communication and organization though of 
a particu1ar kind , ca11ing it a "cybernetic" paradigm wou1d be fair as we11. 
Whatever its. name wíll be , 1 believe the five irnperatives initiate profound 
changes in our scientific thinking , encourage cha11enging constructions and imp1y 
the most noble human concerns imaginable. 1 am asking for cooperation in 
e1aborating the methodo1ogica1 , theoretica1 and socia1 consequences of this new 
paradigm and in app1ying it to scientific research. 1 am convinced that shou1d we 
as communication scholars succeed in this effort , we will have rnade our discipline 
not on1y centra1 to a11 of the humanities and the socia1 sciences but a1so the 
inte11ectua11y most exciting one 
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